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Stock Broker's Liability Under Customs,
Usages, and Rules
Robert H. Jackson*
0 VER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS conspicuous growth and de-
velopment has taken place in the securities field. In 1950
only 3,930 brokers and dealers' were registered with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission; one decade later, over 5,500
were registered. 2 Likewise, the number of customer's men
registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. increased from 28,794 in 1950 to over 100,000 by 1962. The
number of securities issues effectively registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission increased from 400 in
1935 to over 15,000 by 1962, and dollar volume increased from
several hundred million to nearly 20 billion during the same
period. Public participation in the securities market reflects
this expansion: "A study made by the New York Stock Ex-
change shows that during the period 1952-59, the number of
shareholders doubled, and that, in the last three years of that
period, the number increased by nearly one and one-third million
a year." 3
Prior to 1940 the authoritative courts throughout this
country adjudicated numerous cases brought against stockbrokers
by customers for a myriad of reasons. Since 1940, the rapid
growth of stock market speculation has caused a profusion of
violations by customer's men and brokers. Strangely enough,
however, the number of reported cases has not been proportion-
* Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission, Cleveland Branch Office.
A.B., Univ. of Illinois; LL.B., Western Reserve Univ.; member of the Ohio
Bar.
[The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, dis-
claims responsibility for any private publication by any of its employees.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the
staff of the Commission.]
1 Brokers act as agents for customers in attempts to execute their orders,
while dealers act as principals in purchasing or selling stocks to customers
for themselves. For the purpose of this article, reference to brokers will
include dealers unless otherwise noted.
2 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 27th Annual Report 1
(1962).
s Ibid at 1.
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ate to this expansion, 4 especially in light of what the Securities
Exchange Commission said in its 27th Annual Report: 5
concomitantly with the influx of a large number of new and
presumably inexperienced investors into the market, there has
been an influx of new and inexperienced salesmen. At the same
time, the increase in the number of branch offices has tended to
result in less effective supervision of the salesmen. The problem
of supervision is aggravated by the employment of part-time
salesmen and salesmen who operate from their private resi-
dences."
No conclusive explanation exists as to why proportionately
fewer lawsuits are initiated. Perhaps, stockbrokers are unusually
willing to settle any apparently valid complaints in an attempt
to avoid adverse publicity. Conversely, an investor may not
know the procedures regarding possible violation; and may not
even be aware that a violation was committed. On the other
hand, an investor, taking his complaints to an attorney, may
unhappily discover that the attorney is not familiar with this
area and, therefore, is not ordinarily successful against the
stockbroker. Of course, there is a possibility that the standards
of the industry are so high that fewer violations do exist. Then
too, recent history has reflected that during a rising (bull)
market in which investors generally profit, very few complaints
are made by them. Yet, a declining (bear) market, creating
losses, produces a rash of accusations by customers, some valid,
but many fanciful. Whatever reasons are proffered, the fact
remains that investors frequently lose money because of lack
of knowledge on the part of an interested party.
Much of the confusion which now surrounds security market
operations leading to eventual failure and loss might be avoided
if the potential market investor were more thoroughly grounded
in the fundamental characteristics, technicalities, and rules in-
volved in a purchase and sale of such securities. It is therefore
pertinent that all investors, whether experienced or not, learn
and be apprised of the customs, usages, and rules of the broker-
4 Clarification of this statement will be found later in the article. Customers'
men (registered representatives) are either agents or employees of brokers.
Violations committed by them while in the course of their employment or
agency will be imputed to their brokers. Thus, in most instances the
broker will be responsible.
5 SEC, op. cit. supra n. 2.
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age houses, the over-the-counter market, the various national
stock exchanges, and the state and federal laws.
The numerous customs, usages, and rules of the general
law of securities, unfortunately, do not always present technical
exactness. Even within the jurisdictions of Massachusetts and
New York, from which by far the greatest proportion of decisions
have come, clarity and consistency are not known. Each indi-
vidual case must consequently be viewed to determine the
patterns developed in the securities field. The evolution of cus-
toms, usages, and rules is presently in a maturing stage; this
permits broad general doctrines but leaves many questions un-
settled. The general principles should be known by investors and
attorneys alike before stepping into the treacherous securities
field.
Within the framework of this article, it is proposed to con-
sider, in summary form, the doctrines of custom, usage, and rules
frequently violated by stockbrokers.
I
The terms "custom" and "usage" are frequently used
synonymously. Usage, in its narrowest sense, is a uniform
course of conduct and practice, in some particular business, of
which contracting parties have knowledge, either actual or im-
puted, and which is implied to be incorporated into the terms
of a contract. On the other hand, a custom is "such a usage as
by common consent and uniform practice has become the law
of the place, or of the subject-matter to which it relates." 6
Usage consists of a repetition of acts; customs arise out of this
repetition. Custom is the thing to be proved; usage is the evi-
dence of it. 7 The courts will take judicial notice of a custom
when properly established as the equivalent of law.8
Contracts are often affected by custom and usage. "The usage
of business is never permitted to make an entire or new contract
for the parties." 9 Either usage or custom may supply the omis-
6 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary 742 (3rd rev. 1914).
7 55 Am. Jur. 266. "Usages and Customs."
8 Eames v. H. B. Clafin Co., 239 F. 631 (2d Cir. 1917); Caslistoge Vineyard
v. Luchetti, 72 Cal. App. 605, 18 P. 2d 729 (1933).
9 Irwin v. Willier, 110 U. S. 499, 28 L. ed. 225, 4 S. Ct. 160 (1884); Clews
v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 45 L. ed. 1183, 21 S. Ct. 845 (1901); Bennett v.
Logan, 80 Cal. App. 571, 252 P. 662 (1927); Kinney v. Ginny, 136 Misc. 301,
240 N. Y. S. 713 (1930).
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sions where a contract is deficient or incomplete in its terms, but
the contract cannot be contradicted or varied by them, 10 unless
ratified by the customer.
Although by definition, custom and usage are technically
different, they are generally used in the courts of law as equiva-
lent terms. One court has stated: "The words usage, custom and
course of trade are used interchangeably, and it is quite ap-
parent here that the word 'usage' was employed in the sense of
'custom.' "11 Thus in many instances, decisions utilize one word
when meaning the other without serious consequences. The
differences only become significant in the area of evidence as
previously noted.
Practically speaking, rules and regulations of stock exchanges
cannot be regarded as customs. An acknowledged custom is
expressed or defined by the rule.12 Like every other custom, it
must usually be proved whenever asserted, and must always be
shown to fit the facts. But if the rule is generally followed in
practice it will ordinarily be given the force and effect of cus-
tom.13 An exchange rule which is disregarded in practice will
not be given the effect of usage. 14
H
The history of the court's recognition of stock exchange
rules and regulations as law has not been consistent. In the well-
known Bibb v. Allen case15 it was held that a stock exchange,
which is organized under the statutes of New York for a lawful
business purpose, had power to make such rules and regulations
as "might be deemed necessary and proper to carry out the
purpose of its organization." Thus, the court early recognized
such rules as proper evidence without further proof when con-
templated business is transacted on such an exchange. Since
10 Moore v. United States, 196 U. S. 157, 49 L. ed. 428, 25 S. Ct. 202, (1905);
Thomas v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N. E. 183 (1910).
For typical brokers' practice forms and contracts see, 5 Oleck, Modern
Corporation Law, Forms 824, 825 et passim (1960).
11 Oppenheimer Bros., Inc. v. Joyce, 20 Ill. App. 2d 34, 154 N. E. 2d 856
(1958); Richmond v. Union Steamboat Co., 87 N. Y. 240 (1881).
12 Chicrello & Bros., Inc. v. Central R.R. of N. J., 256 F. 297 (2d Cir. 1919).
'3 Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819, 13 S. Ct. 953 (1892).
'4 1 Myer, Law of Stockbrokers 161 (1931).
15 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819, 13 S. Ct. 953 (1892).
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then, other courts16 have acknowledged that stock exchanges
have the power to enact such rules and regulations concerning
the government of their affairs, accepting them as evidence,
without question, unless they are contrary to public policy.17
In one recent case,18 where the parties involved stipulated the
New York Stock Exchange rules into the record, the court took
judicial notice of them. Yet another decision 9 held that "the
rules of a trading exchange cannot have the effect of statutory
law"; consequently, each rule alleged as pertinent must be
proven through evidence to show that the rule is a custom cur-
rently in usage on the exchange. Moreover, mere violation of a
rule of a stock exchange by a member does not give rise to civil
liability to customers without another rule enforcing such
causes of action.
20
When the brokerage house through which the customer
transacts his business is a member of a stock exchange, then such
broker can be liable to his customer, if a violation exists, under
the applicable exchange rule. If the same member broker trans-
acts his customer's business as directed (expressed or implied)
in the over-the-counter market, he must then comply with the
Securities and Exchange Commission's rules and regulations, the
customs and usages currently prevailing in such market, and the
National Association of Securities Dealers' rules, if he is a mem-
ber of that group, and bears responsibility to his customer under
those conditions. But he may additionally be liable under his
stock exchange rules and regulations which specifically subject
such outside transactions to its control. 21 Some cases2 2 hold that
when a non-member broker transacts business for his customer
through a member of an exchange, then both non-member and
customer are subject to the exchange's rules and regulations.
This has resulted in a vast number of inequities, one of which
16 Franks v. Bridges, 337 Mass. 287, 149 N. E. 2d 131 (1958); Pernie Simons
& Co. v. Whitney, 259 N. Y. S. 193 (1932).
17 Garcia Sugar Corp. v. N. Y. Cotton & Sugar Exchange, 7 N. Y. 2d 532
(1938); Thomson v. Thomson, 315 Ill. 521 (1926).
18 James Wood General Trading Establishment v. Coe, 191 F. Supp. 330
(S. D. N. Y. 1961).
19 Dupont v. Neiman, 156 Cal. App. 313, 319 P. 2d 60 (1957).
20 Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 220 N. Y. 2d 1001 (1961).
21 Kernahan v. Wallace, 248 N. W. 904 (Mich. 1933).
22 Korns v. Thomas & McKinnon, 22 F. Supp. 442 (D. Minn. 1938); Lynch
v. Maw, 3 Utah 271, 282 P. 2d 841 (1955).
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places an undue burden on the debtor-creditor relationship. It
is hoped this situation will be alleviated as indicated in a recent
case.
23
Since the large over-the-counter market has no specific
center of activity, the customs and usages in such a market can
vary greatly from one city to another and from one brokerage
house to another even in the same locale. Some day it is hoped
this incongruity may be changed to a centralized operation with
rules and established customs applicable throughout the country.
In the meantime, the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the National Association of Securities Dealers' acts and rules
help stabilize the problem. The Securities Exchange Act of
193424 permits stock exchanges to have as many rules as the
exchange considers necessary for just operations. It must have
one rule wherein members, guilty of violating such rules against
customers, can be sued under the rules and regulations; and,
it may not have any which conflict with the federal statutes.
25
As regards the over-the-counter market, the Securities and
Exchange Commission's statutes are generally applied where a
fraud situation26 or an illegal contract 27 arise between broker
and customer. Otherwise, the customer must rely upon agency
and contract laws of the various states, and the prevailing
customs and usages in local markets when contract disputes
arise. As to the latter, however, reference to the current rules
and usages of the various national stock exchanges in determin-
ing an over-the-counter dispute can be helpful.
28
Awareness of the laws and judicial decisions of the State of
New York and the New York Stock Exchange rules are impor-
tant for several reasons. In the first place, a great majority of
23 Johnson v. Winslow, 155 Misc. 170, 279 N. Y. S. 147 (1935).
Why should a customer know the rules governing a third-party, the
member broker, when he does not direct his broker to seek execution of
such order on that exchange? This question has not been answered.
24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 78a to 78jj (Exchange Act).
25 Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 S. 2d 170 (Fla. 1950); Kernahan v. Wallace,
248 N. W. 904 (Mich. 1933).
26 Exchange Act, Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder, 15 U. S. C.
78j, 17 C. F. R. 240.10b-5; Sec. 11, 15 U. S. C. 77k; Sec. 17, 15 U. S. C. 78q.
27 Exchange Act, Section 29(a), (b), (c), 15 U. S. C. 78cc; Rospigliosi v.
Clogher, 46 S. 2d 170 (Fla. 1950).
28 Writings dealing with this area are numerous; e.g., Andresen, Manipu-
lation of Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 10 Geo. Wash. L. R. No. 639
(1942); Friend, The Over-the-Counter Securities Market (1958).
Jan., 1963
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss1/12
STOCK BROKER'S LIABILITY
securities transactions are effected on the New York Stock
Exchange. Secondly, a transaction effected on an exchange in
New York will be governed by New York law, irrespective of
where the parties to the transaction may reside or where the
order for the transaction may have been given, unless that
particular state has enacted securities laws or has case law
which makes New York law contrary to its own law and thus
violates the state's public policy. Additionally, New York's
judicial decisions have given careful consideration to the many
questions raised in this field.2 9
m
It is well-settled that when a customer transacts business
on a stock exchange or market through a broker who is a mem-
ber of such exchange or market, he confers authority (directly
or by implication) on the broker to carry on such business in
accordance with the prevailing customs, usages, and rules, even
though the customer may in fact have no knowledge of them.
30
With certain limitations, the broker must comply with the prac-
tices of the market necessary to properly effect his customer's
transaction, whether or not the customer directed him to that
particular market 31 since the broker has, as above stated, suffici-
ent authority to execute the order. Consequently, a customer
cannot plead ignorance of such customs and rules, and the trans-
action binds him when he decides to confer such authority.
A customer is not bound by a usage of a particular broker-
age house unless the usage is so well-known as to have become
a custom recognized by the courts.3 2 Often a brokerage house,
29 Even in states which have securities laws, their courts often refer to
New York decisions. For articles in this area see Demmler, Continuing Role
of the States in Securities Regulations, 180 Com. & Fin. Chr. No. 1390
(1954); Edelman, Securities Regulations in the 48 States (1942); Frank,
S. E. C. Respects State Jurisdiction, 26 Pub. Util. Fort. No. 259 (1940);
Kearns, Coordination of Securities Acts, 31 Ill. L. R. 718 (1937).
50 Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819, 13 S. Ct. 953 (1893); Clews v.
Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 45 L. ed. 1183, 21 S. Ct. 845 (1901); Sisler v. Ray,
213 Cal. 620, 2 P. 2d 987 (1931); Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 28 A. 874
(1893); Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N. E. 153 (1916); Shuman v. Gold-
smith, 115 Misc. 327, 188 N. Y. S. 84 (1921).
31 Van Dusen-Harrington Co. v. Jungeblut, 75 Minn. 298, 77 N. W. 970
(1899); Thomson v. Thomson, 315 Ill. 521, 146 N. E. 451 (1925) Hallet
v. Aggergaard, 21 S. D. 554, 114 N. W. 696 (1908).
32 Baker v. Drake, 66 N. Y. 518 (1876); and see Markham v. Jaudon, 41
N. Y. 235 (1869). Brokerage firm custom and usage is still an important
factor but there are few reported cases in this area.
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as an offensive weapon in a case, will try to maintain that a
particular usage or practice of theirs is a recognized custom in
the field. Fortunately for the customer, this has generally been
defeated in courts of law.
A customer, as party to a contract, which relies on a rule
or usage of an exchange, that violates his legal rights, will not
be bound to the transaction if he was ignorant of such illegality.33
The underlying reason for this holding is that it cannot be im-
plied that the customer intended to be bound by any rule or
usage which was inconsistent with his legal rights and of which
he was ignorant. Notwithstanding, if a customer is informed of
a rule or usage, but fails to register any objection, he will be
bound to such contract; however, he is not bound by amendments
or new rules passed subsequent to the transaction unless he knew
of and had agreed to them.3 4 Customers and brokers can, of
course, contract in contravention of the rules of markets or
exchanges, especially if the customer did not know the rules
which were violated.3 5
A custom or usage, in practice or not, which is contrary to
law or to public policy is invalid and will not be enforced.
3 6
This is also true of rules and regulations of stock exchanges
enacted to govern their affairs.37
IV
Practically all transactions with the broker are contractual
in nature, whether expressed in writing or implied through oral
direction and consent. Countless ramifications, subtle nuances,
and continual hazards jeopardize the unsophisticated investor's
financial stability when he participates in the securities market.
From the foregoing, it can be observed that a stockbroker's
liability is not readily ascertained since the securities field is
both technical and complicated. It is difficult in an article of this
33 Dupont v. Neiman, 156 Cal. App. 313, 319 P. 2d 60 (1957); Garcia Sugar
Corp. v. N. Y. Cotton & Sugar Exchange, 7 N. Y. 2d 532 (1938).
34 Thomson v. Thomson, 315 Ill. 521, 146 N. E. 451 (1925).
35 Doan v. Dyer, 286 F. 339 (1923); Kernahan v. Wallace, 248 N. W. 904
(Mich. 1933). The violation of a rule may not necessarily involve anyone's
legal rights, but such rule may simply be policy of the exchange.
36 Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 489 (1893); Grace v. Livingston, 195 F. Supp.
933 (D. C. Mass. 1961); Jones v. DeRonde, 142 Misc. 831, 255 N. Y. S. 505
(1932).
37 Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 220 N. Y. 2d 1001 (1961); Ernst v.
Miller, 293 N. Y. S. 819 (1937).
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length to enumerate all the basic customs, usages, and rules
commonly violated by the broker in his daily intercourse with
his customers. Therefore, a limited review will be made of a
few elementary usages and rules to provide insight into some
pertinent problems of broker-customer relations.
The customer may buy or sell securities (referred to as
orders) through any one of several methods and also have his
account carried in different ways. The method employed in
effecting such order is determined largely by the type of issue.
Certain securities, traded on stock exchanges, are known as
"listed" issues; execution of orders for these issues are con-
summated with member broker firms of the particular exchange
involved, whether or not the order was placed with that firm.
"Unlisted" issues are bought and sold directly by most brokerage
firms, acting as dealers in such issues without aid of an organized
market (referred to as the over-the-counter market).
Based upon the instructions given to the broker relating
to the price at which they are to be executed, most customers'
orders may be divided into the following categories: (1) at-the-
market orders; (2) fixed price orders; (3) cancel orders; (4)
stop-loss orders; and (5) discretionary orders.3s Regarding
these, the most common violations by brokers are non-execution
or improper execution of an order. Regardless of the type of
order placed by the customer (unless it is unreasonable), the
broker has no right to delay execution of a transaction. A broker
cannot "interfere with another's speculation by delay in carry-
ing out orders clearly and properly given." 39 All orders must be
promptly executed with a high degree of skill and integrity.
Likewise, a broker cannot depart from an established custom
in executing an order.40 As the customer has the right to desig-
nate the price at which his securities may be sold, the broker
may not vary that price and, in such instances, the customer may
repudiate the entire transaction. It is a well-established custom
38 For a definition of these terms see Schabacher, Stock Market Theory
and Practice (1931); Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., The Security Market
(1938). Discretionary orders will not be discussed since their problems
ordinarily do not arise under the subject matter herein. A broker can
act as both dealer and broker with his customer involving separate trans-
actions under different groups of rules and regulations even with the same
customer.
39 Grace v. Livingston, 195 F. Supp. 933 (D. C. Mass. 1961).
40 Herrlier v. Tochini, 72 Cal. App. 218, 18 P. 2d 73 (1933); provided that
the custom, under current conditions, is not unreasonable nor illegal.
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that a broker, under a stop-loss order, must record and execute
it upon proper instructions; failure to do so is both a breach of
contractual duty and tortious. 41 If the broker executes the order
before such price has been reached, the execution is unauthor-
ized and the customer may repudiate it or may hold the broker
for damages.
4 2
Upon execution of an order, a broker is required to send a
confirmation to his customer reporting same.43 The customer
must be given full notification of every transaction in writing,
setting forth "a description of the securities purchased or sold,
the name of the person, firm or corporation from whom such
securities were purchased, or to which the same were sold, and
the day, and hours between which the transaction took place." 44
Although now a statutory requirement, brokers have always
followed a custom of giving the aforementioned data to their
customers, but it should be noted that some brokerage firms
utilize confused confirmation in violation of the law.
When the confirmation states "we confirm purchase from
you," it does not necessarily put the customer on notice that the
broker purchased the security for him. "No person who is
ignorant of such custom or usage, even under a printed slip, can
be held to have agreed to submit to its conditions, merely by
employing the services of a broker, to whom the usage is
known . . ." 45 A normal agency relationship does not change,
except by consent of both parties.46 A broker cannot be both
agent and principal without knowledge of and consent by the
customer.
41 James Wood General Trading Establishment v. Coe, 191 F. Supp. 330
(S. D. N. Y. 1961).
42 Mass v. Gordon, 101 S. 2d 836 (Fla. 1958); Baldwin v. Peters, 349 P. 2d
146 (Colo. 1960). In this area the customer is often unaware that accept-
ance by the broker of a stop-loss order creates a valid and binding contract,
the violation of which, by the broker, creates a cause of action.
43 Exchange Act, Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5, and Rule 15c 1-4; 15
U. S. C. 78j, 17 C. F. R. 240.1ob-5, 17 C. F. R. 240.15c 1-4. This rule is
limited to over-the-counter brokers and dealers, but requirements for
members of exchanges are substantially the same; see Exchange Act
Section 11(d) (2), 15 U. S. C. 78k (d) (2). See also, Hawkins v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W. D. Ark. 1949).
44 MacDonald v. Wills & Co., 240 N. Y. 144 (1925); see also 71 A. L. R. 2d
1089; New York Penal Law, §§ 392, 957.
45 Johnson v. Winslow, 155 Misc. 170, 279 N. Y. S. 147 (1935); see 71 A. L. R.
2d 1089; Hall v. Prince, 224 Mass. 66, 112 N. E. 153 (1916).
46 Ibid. Measure of damages for customer, if transaction cannot be re-
scinded soon enough, is difference between price broker charged and price
that would have been obtained if trade had been effected in normal market.
Jan., 1963
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A broker may represent both buyer and seller in negotiating
a purchase or sale so long as he is in accord with the rules and
usages of his exchange or market. Such sale is binding and is
not opposed to public policy.47 An undisclosed principal as pur-
chaser or seller may exist as a custom respecting unlisted
securities when the transaction takes place between dealers
familiar with such trades.
The broker may not make a secret profit out of a trans-
action which is entrusted to him. If he charges his customer a
price higher than that which he paid for the stock, the broker
fails to perform his contract of agency, and his customer may re-
pudiate the entire transaction.48 At one time custom permitted
a broker to make and retain a secret profit from a customer's
transaction but it is now against public policy and law.
49
Accounts with brokers fall into two major categories-cash
accounts and margin accounts. In a cash account, purchases are
made outright for full ownership and sales are ordinarily made
against immediate delivery of securities. To open a margin ac-
count, the buyer deposits, with his broker, cash or securities
equal to a portion of the price of the security (margin) and his
broker advances the balance. To finance this balance, the broker
uses his own capital or obtains such funds by pledging the pur-
chased securities with a bank as collateral. If the price of the
stock declines, the customer must, at the broker's discretion, keep
adequate margin by depositing additional cash or securities.
Under certain limitations, if the margin falls below the broker's
percentage, a margin call is sent to the customer; if the customer
fails to provide additional margin, the broker may sell the mar-
gined securities.
It is customary for brokers, on opening a margin account,
to require a customer's signature on a card under which he
agrees to certain conditions. One condition generally included
is that, unless additional capital or securities are placed in the
account when the stock drops in price, such stock will then be
sold out. The courts have held that such signature on the card,
47 Heinerdinger v. Schnitzler, 231 App. Div. 649, 248 N. Y. S. 597 (1931).
At least one case disagrees; see Whelen v. Craig, 98 Pa. Supp. 103 (1929).
48 Cohen v. Rothchild, 182 App. Div. 408 (N. Y. 1918); Johnson v. Winslow,
155 Misc. 170, 279 N. Y. S. 147 (1935).
49 Day v. Holmes, 103 Mass. 306 (1869); People v. Royal Securities Corp.,
5 Misc. 2d 907, 965 N. Y. S. 2d (1955); Exchange Act Rule 15c 1-2, 17
C. F. R. 240.15c 1-2.
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resembling a contract, lacks consideration because for "this
enticing parting with his rights the customer receives no cor-
relative advantage." 50 A broker cannot hold a customer liable
on an agreement to supply margin incidental to the purchase of
securities unless there is an express agreement to furnish
margin.51 The broker cannot assume that such agreement was
inferred as a trade custom implied from the nature of the agency.
The relation between customer and broker is that of pledgor
and pledgee. The broker must give reasonable notice of further
margin needs.5 2 When a broker violates a rule of an exchange,
state, or federal law involving a customer's margin account, it
does not give rise to a cause of action by the customer against
the broker if no loss has been incurred.53
Reasonable rules and usages of the exchanges or market
where the parties transact business may determine the type of
collateral receivable as margin in the absence of an agreement.54
Demand for margin and notice of sale cannot be ignored
even though there is a custom permitting the sale of a customer's
securities without demand and notice. Such a custom, if it
existed, would be inconsistent with the contract between the
parties and would be unenforceable unless the customer had
expressly waived it.55 The broker has the right to rehypothecate
his customer's securities for an amount not in excess of the
customer's indebtedness against such securities. But usages per-
mitting the broker the right to mingle them with securities of
50 Jones v. De Ronde, 142 Misc. 831, 255 N. Y. S. 505 (1932); see also Mark-
ham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869). Many problems resulting from cash
and margin accounts are similar in nature and can be grouped.
51 Pernie Simons & Co. v. Whitney, 259 N. Y. S. 193 (1932). If the margined
stock were to drop in price, causing greater debt than originally agreed
upon, there is no law which requires the brokerage firm to ask for addi-
tional capital. The amount requested and amount of time for delivery will
vary according to the brokerage firm's discretion and relationship with
the customer.
52 Ibid.; Byrne v. Weidenfield, 113 App. Div. 451, 99 N. Y. S. 412 (1906).
53 Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 220 N. Y. 2d 1001 (1961); Nichols & Co.
v. Columbus Cr. Corp., 204 Misc. 848 (N. Y. 1904). The courts generally
hold that reasonable notice means actual notice with an opportunity to
supply additional margin.
54 Ling v. Malcom, 77 Conn. 517, 89 A. 698 (1905); Whitney v. Nolan, 296
Mass. 419, 6 N. E. 2d 386 (1936); 1 Meyer, Law of Stockbrokers, 169 (1931).
55 A. B. Kidder & Co. v. Turner, 106 S. 2d 905 (Fla. 1958); Markham v.
Jauden, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869). Publicly issued securities, bonds, debentures,
and government securities are the common type of collateral used. Closely-
held corporate stock is seldom accepted as collateral because of its lack
of negotiability due generally to stock restrictions.
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others in the broker's general loan 6 or rehypothecate them for
an excessive amount will not be enforced.5 7
When the purchase or sale of securities is made on an ex-
change, the rules and regulations of such exchange will apply
to the terms of delivery and payment. On the other hand, if such
purchase or sale was not made on an exchange, such terms are
fixed by the prevailing customs and usages of the locale. In the
absence of an express agreement between the parties, delivery
and payment must be made within a reasonable time.58 However,
the rules of an exchange located in a particular market, respect-
ing time and place of delivery, may be so universally followed
as to constitute a usage of the market even though the trans-
action was not effected on that exchange. 59
V
Customs, usages, and rules aid in the interpretation of the
meaning of the express language in an agreement between
parties. They also add provisions, not expressly stated by the
parties, to the contract, and make inapplicable to an agreement
rules of law otherwise applicable. Their primary purpose is
generally to ascertain and to give effect to the intention of the
parties. Thus customs, usages, and rules significantly interpret
the entire contract between the broker and customer.
A customer who employs a broker to effect a transaction
on a stock exchange or market of which the broker is a member,
in general may expect to be bound by the customs and usages on
that exchange or market. Such customer is not bound by a rule or
custom which varies the legal relationship existing between the
56 Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284 (1913). Many problems arise about these
situations and more particularly as to customer's legal rights regarding
brokerage insolvency. As a general rule, a customer has the right to re-
claim securities held for him by a broker, provided he is able to find them
in the broker's box or in his pledge. For detailed information see: Duel v.
Hollins, 241 U. S. 523, 60 L. ed. 1143, 36 S. Ct. 615 (1916); Leonard v. Hunt,
36 F. 2d 13 (1 C. C. A. 1915); Korns v. Thomson & McKinnon, 22 F. Supp.
442 (D. Minn. 1938); Lynch v. Maw, 3 Utah 271, 282 P. 2d 841 (1955);
Mandaville v. Pooler, 198 A. 235 (R. I. 1938); Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn.
198, 26 A. 198 (1893); 1 Meyer supra n. 54 at 600 (1931).
57 Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N. Y. 168 (1927); Wood v. Fisk, 215 N. Y. 233
(1915).
5s Stroud v. Sautbine, 18 F. 2d 883 (C. C. A. 8, 1927).
59 Damages are the difference between market price at the time actually
delivered and the time it should have been delivered. Isham v. Post, 141
N. Y. 100 (1894).
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parties unless the customer had actual knowledge of such rule
or custom, or expressly contracted with reference to it. More-
over, a customer generally cannot be bound by a rule or custom
which is illegal or unreasonable.
The serious market decline this past spring, and the chaotic
conditions that resulted therefrom, produced a valuable lesson.
A vast number of margin calls were made by brokerage firms
with subsequent complaints by customers who either could not
supply additional capital or thought it was unreasonable at a
time when their holdings incurred drastic losses. Many margined
securities were sold, followed by complaints and, in some cases,
by court actions. Probably numerous losses could have been
avoided and brokers would have retained some valuable ac-
counts if the customer had been better informed.
As the holdings demonstrate, evolution of stockbrokers'
liability has not resulted in clearly discernible principles; the
many exceptions and questions raised, but not settled, prevent it.
Meanwhile, both customer and broker are fortunate to have
controls by Federal and state laws, the various exchange rules
and regulations, and case law, which should continue to ad-
vance in certainty as the growth in securities transactions ex-
pand. A customer's education in securities market procedure
must be supplemented with additional knowledge; a broker's
cooperation is imperative to accomplish this end.
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